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Abstract – The purpose of this paper is to revisit what scholars understand 
about the impact of stereotypes on consumer perceptions. There are many 
current examples of negative brand or company images based on stereotypes, 
but researchers have generally lost touch with a vintage body of literature 
(primarily 1980s) that still holds important clues to understanding this 
phenomenon. While most of these findings come out of other disciplines such as 
psychology and social cognition, those emphasized here have strong marketing 
implications.  
 
Keywords – Stereotypes, Brand image, Schemas 
 
Relevance to Marketing Educators, Researchers and/or Practitioners – 
The paper proposes five hypotheses for future research that can help scholars 
and practitioners assess various tools available to address a problematic image. 
These include consistent, moderately inconsistent, and inconsistent information; 
affect-laden attributes; and communication contexts. 
Introduction 
Three years after Toyota recalled some of its 2009/2010 vehicles amid reports of 
unintended acceleration, the company still felt the effects of a damaged 
reputation. Despite strong efforts to reassure drivers and disprove allegations of 
wrongdoing, its US sales remained flat at a time when almost all its rivals 
enjoyed significant gains. Likewise, Domino’s Pizza had to fight its way back 
from millions of dollars in losses after two employees posted a YouTube video of 
themselves adulterating the food – despite the absence of any other evidence of 
unsanitary conditions at the chain’s outlets.  
JC Penney has struggled to overcome its image as a dowdy bargain 
basement, even after radically reshaping its advertising messages and store 
layouts. BP remained in disfavor with American consumers long after the Gulf of 
Mexico oil spill. 
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Such situations – when a problematic image hardens into a stereotype in 
consumers’ minds, and becomes resistant to change – are no less challenging to 
marketers today than decades ago. Yet researchers may have lost touch with a 
vintage body of literature that still holds important clues to understanding this 
phenomenon. Specifically, this stream of work examined (1) how information is 
used to create, reinforce, or weaken the perceptual device we know as a 
stereotype, and (2) what situation-specific circumstances (e.g. the nature of the 
perceptual task, the content of new information) may influence the impact of this 
information. 
The purpose of this paper is to revisit what scholars understand about these 
topics. Since most of the research comes out of other disciplines (primarily 
psychology and social cognition), the emphasis is on findings that invite 
marketing applications.  
The Nature of Stereotypes: A Historical Overview 
Walter Lippmann introduced the term "stereotype" to socio-psychological 
analysis in his groundbreaking 1922 book Public Opinion. Remarkably, his 
analysis foreshadowed all three of the research orientations that later emerged 
(Hamilton 1981), perhaps because, writing as a journalist and not as a social 
scientist, Lippmann was comfortable simply throwing out as many ideas as he 
considered interesting. 
The psychodynamic orientation, popular in the work of psychologists with a 
general interest in intergroup relations at least through the 1960s, characterizes 
stereotypes as serving the needs of the ego and projecting inner drives. In his 
comment that "A pattern of stereotypes...is the guarantee of our self-respect; it is 
the projection upon the world of our own sense of our own value, our own 
position, and our own rights" (Lippmann 1922, 96), Lippmann anticipated the 
analysis of such researchers as Bettelheim and Janowitz (1950) and Adorno and 
Sanford (1950). Their focus on the links between personality psychology and 
prejudice (particularly in the latter's famous book The Authoritarian 
Personality) gave rise to a body of literature more concerned with discriminatory 
bias than with stereotypes per se, and largely known for introducing the concept 
of  "Stereotypes, in the form of negative attributions...[as] displacement of 
aggression or projection" (Miller 1986, 27). 
The sociocultural orientation seeks its explanations about stereotypes not in 
characteristics of the individual, but in the cultural norms and socialization 
process of society. It is assumed that stereotypes consist of stable, shared 
intergroup perceptions which are accepted and perpetuated in much the same 
way as are role definitions and behavior expectations -- that is, from parent to 
child, friend to friend, and through the dictates of societal institutions (church, 
school, etc.). As in the psychodynamic orientation, stereotypes are, for the most 
part, depicted as negative; from this perspective, Lippmann comments on the 
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function of stereotypes in society as follows: "And since my moral system rests on 
my accepted version of the facts, he who denies either my moral judgments or 
my version of the facts is to me perverse, alien, dangerous. How shall I account 
for him? The opponent has always to be explained..." (Lippmann 1922, 126). 
From this orientation arose a methodological paradigm that produced the 
first critical insights into the content of stereotypes. In 1933, Katz and Braly 
developed a list of 84 positive and negative trait adjectives, which they exposed 
to 100 college students who were asked to select those that seemed most typical 
of a series of ethnic groups. They found a considerable degree of consensus across 
groups, even when it was clear that the subjects had little or no direct experience 
with a particular group, such as Turks (Katz and Braly 1933). This paradigm 
was replicated innumerable times by scholars in various disciplines seeking 
specific trait-based descriptors of ethnic character; in the field of consumer 
behavior, for example, one researcher found that American Jews are represented 
as "strongly competitive, eclectic, rational, innovative, cognitively complex, 
individualistic, information-seeking, and achievement-oriented" (Hirschman 
1985, 149). 
The continued popularity of elements of the sociocultural orientation reflects 
its adaptability to evolving societal concerns. While "Racial conflict in the United 
States and the Nazi holocaust were unquestionably the most influential 'events' 
in directing the attention of social scientists to these concerns..." (Miller 1986, 
16), later years saw the focus change to sex stereotypes and a wider array of 
global stereotypes (Berndt and Heller 1986, Eagly and Kite 1987, Skrypnek and 
Snyder 1982). Though more recently combined with a cognitive perspective, the 
sociocultural orientation long provided a useful conceptual bridge between 
academic inquiry and popular culture. 
The third major orientation in the field is also the one that dominates more 
recent investigations. This is the cognitive orientation, which differs from the 
others in a critical way: it does not view stereotypes as bad by definition. In this 
approach, stereotypes are instances of normal social cognition processes that 
facilitate, for better or for worse, people's categorization of and responses toward 
one another. 
Again, Lippmann foreshadowed this perspective: "We do not so much see 
this man and that sunset; rather we notice that the thing is man or sunset and 
then see chiefly what our mind is already full of on those subjects" (Lippmann 
1922, 87). This general line of thinking was first pursued by the psychologist 
Allport, who linked social categorization to prejudice while pointing out that 
stereotyping results from the normal process of trying to simplify a complex 
social environment (Allport 1954). His work spawned many later investigations 
designed to show the everyday outcomes of this simplification; for example, 
Taylor (1980) argued that categorizing people into ingroups and outgroups 
inevitably leads to favoritism and discrimination.   
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Tajfel (1959) extended Allport's concept of stereotyping as an outgrowth of 
basic cognitive processes by demonstrating that simple cues, such as the letters 
A or B, when associated with certain conceptual categories will bias subjects' 
judgments toward those categories. In his research, the letter A was correlated 
with short lines and B with long lines. Subjects then systematically 
underestimated the length of any line labelled A, and vice-versa. A body of 
literature eventually developed not only around the use of cues in information 
processing, but more generally aimed at understanding judgment simplification 
strategies as they relate to stereotypes. A summary of this literature concluded 
that "...cognitive limitations make humans susceptible to systematic biases in 
processing information about people and events, and these biases contribute 
significantly to the formation and maintenance of stereotypes regarding social 
groups" (Hamilton 1981, 29). 
As mentioned above, later research was dominated by the cognitive 
orientation. But there was never a generally settled consensus on theoretical 
sub-issues that remain relevant to marketing. 
The Nature of Stereotypes: Later Perspectives 
In attempting to come to grips with the rich but sometimes contradictory 
empirical findings generated over thirty years, most researchers in the field 
narrowed their focus to one of four areas: (1) stereotypes as subjective base-rate 
probabilities; (2) stereotypes as judgmental heuristics; and (3) stereotypes as 
culturally-inculcated expectancies; and (4) stereotypes as schemas.  
Those who adopted the first perspective follow an early definition of 
stereotypes as "instances of a general class of cognitive events, namely, prior 
probabilities (Locksley et.al. 1982, 24). This Bayesian-type theory asserts that 
people form beliefs about the supposed incidence of certain traits or propensities 
among population subgroups, and base upon these beliefs a stable set of 
expectations concerning the groups' behavior. Importantly, in keeping with other 
instances of the use of probability estimation in cognition, these researchers 
repeatedly demonstrated that stereotypes will be underutilized or ignored in 
judgment situations where subjects are given individuating case information (as 
an example, see Regner et.al. 2002).  
However, base-rate advocates failed to explain a number of contradictory or 
inconclusive findings (Chun and Kruglanski 2006). For example, one study found 
that availability of stereotype-consistent information could cause stereotype-
inconsistent, individuating information to be abandoned -- the exact opposite of 
the theory's prediction (Bodenhausen and Wyer 1985; Koehler 1996). 
Proponents of the judgmental heuristics concept believed that stereotypes 
play the constructive role of helping people manage a complex informational 
environment. These researchers generally found that stereotypes-as-heuristics 
are strongest when information processing demands are high. In a classic study, 
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subjects asked to determine the guilt or innocence of a defendant in an assault 
trial on the basis of ambiguous evidence (a difficult judgment) tended to activate 
an ethnic stereotype; while subjects asked simply to comment on the defendant's 
level of aggressiveness did not activate the stereotype (Bodenhausen and 
Lichtenstein 1987). 
Those interested in stereotypes as culturally-inculcated expectancies 
essentially followed in the footsteps and extended the work of earlier writers of 
the sociocultural orientation. Their research focused on the effects of role 
assignment, norms, and gender expectations on intergroup interactions, and 
thus had limited relevance to marketing.   
The base-rate probability and heuristic approaches help to explain how 
stereotypes affect attention and direction of processing resources. Either 
stereotypes activate an encoding bias, which results in selective attention to 
stereotype-consistent information; or an attributional bias, which causes extra 
processing of inconsistent information as the subject tries to reconcile it with the 
preexisting stereotype (Miller and Turnbull 1986; von Hippel et.al. 1995). 
However, only schema theory, the fourth perspective on stereotypes, can account 
for the activation of affect upon encounter with stereotype-consistent 
information -- a critical dimension when considering the impact of stereotypes on 
consumer perceptions. 
Stereotypes as Schemas 
A schema is broadly defined as an "abstract, general structure that establishes 
relations between specific events or entities" (Landman and Manis 1983, 77). 
More specifically, a schema stores knowledge about past experiences, helps 
people organize this information around socially-constructed expectancies, and 
produces a guide to comprehension and action -- in a sense, a script to be 
followed in future similar situations (Stangor 2000). 
While not synonymous with schemas, stereotypes may be viewed as a 
subclass of schemas characterized by a particularly high degree of affective 
and/or motivational involvement. Importantly, this perspective offers parsimony 
-- as well as a theory of cognitive process that suggests ways to alter 
stereotypical judgments. 
The schema concept is parsimonious because it connects certain processes 
common across a range of social knowledge such as roles, expectations, beliefs, 
and impressions. It also illustrates the similarities in how people process 
information across social and nonsocial domains. Moreover, this characteristic of 
schemas bridges the gap between person-focused stereotypes and and object-
focused stereotypes. It suggests that prior experience, stored as a set of 
abstractions in a readily-accessible network of knowledge, has a similar 
cognitive impact regardless of whether the experience was with Jews or with 
toothpaste (Lynch and Schuler 1994).   
Revisiting Stereotype Research & Its Marketing Implications Atlantic Marketing Journal | 75  
 
People seem to strive for structure in cognitive input, and the incorporation 
of new stimuli into an existing schema provides such structure. In turn, 
schematic structuring appears to improve recall of what might otherwise have 
been a cognitively burdensome number and/or variety of pieces of information 
(Taylor and Crocker 1980; Biernat and Dovidio 2000). 
There is some disagreement on the question of whether schema-relevant or 
schema-irrelevant material is better recalled, as both conclusions have been 
reached in various studies.Explanations rest primarily on the notion that 
schema-consistent information is readily assimilated into preexisting knowledge 
structures, while schema-inconsistent data is subjected to a more intense degree 
of processing as the receiver attempts to reconcile it with the schema, thus 
rendering it more distinctive and memorable. It is possible that "Stereotypes and 
other schema resist disconfirmation [because] the effect of presenting evidence 
against their accuracy is to strengthen the beliefs of which they rest and to 
enhance memory for evidence supporting their validity" (O'Sullivan and Dorso 
1984, 67). 
More intriguing is another finding, stimulated by continuing investigations 
into the recall issue, that moderately inconsistent information may be better 
recalled than schema-consistent information. For example, one classic study 
showed that when subjects are given both a list of traits describing an 
individual, and a list of adjectives congruent with the original descriptions, they 
tend to recall moderately congruent adjectives better than highly congruent or 
incongruent adjectives (Hastie and Kumar 1979; Mandler 1982; Taylor and 
Crocker 1980). This may occur because moderately inconsistent information 
generates unexpected or idiosyncratic associations, without being so inconsistent 
as to cause out-of-hand rejection. Additionally, it is possible that inconsistent 
information gets the perceiver's attention more readily than information he 
already knows. Both possibilities have interesting marketing implications, in 
that the presentation (through advertising and/or other promotional media) of 
new information moderately incongruent with the existing image of a product or 
brand may be an effective method to (1) capture the consumer's attention and (2) 
begin to alter what would otherwise be a totally schema/stereotype-driven 
judgment. 
Finally, schema theory provides an explanation for the triggering of affect 
that typically accompanies activation of a stereotype (Kashima 2000). The 
importance of affect is obvious in that a simple positive or negative "sense" about 
a person, object, or entity may be enough to tip the judgment of a cognitively 
overburdened individual; moreover, as one scholar commented: "Affect is the 
very reason stereotypes matter. Pigeonholing a person to fit one's oversimplified 
beliefs is certainly an issue, but prejudice is another, more serious issue (Fiske 
1982, 1).  
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Proponents of schematic structuring suggest that an overall affect is stored 
within a schema as a summary of all of its positive or negative affective 
components. This makes for both efficiency and predictability when the person 
calls upon the schema as a guide to action. However, they also suggest that 
isolated items of information may have affective impact, by continually 
modifying the cumulative impression. This creates another bridge to consumer 
research: Schematic structuring eliminates the cognitive necessity to re-compute 
positives and negatives across all component attributes each time a new one is 
introduced, thereby reducing the risk that one longstanding bad association with 
a product or brand will hopelessly overwhelm any future good one.  
To summarize, at three three marketing implications arise from the 
stereotype-as-schema perspective: 
(1) Schema theory bridges the gap between social and nonsocial domains, 
providing a framework within which findings about person perception/social 
cognition can be applied to object perception/category cognition 
(2) Research suggests that moderately inconsistent information may be 
effective at stimulating recall and influencing stereotype-driven judgment, and 
(3) Schema theory expresses the role of affect as a fluid and modifiable one, 
subject to change as new attributes are introduced over time. 
Marketing Implications of Selected Research on Stereotypes in 
Light of Schematic Structure Assumptions 
While the marketing implications discussed above relate to certain basic 
findings and debates in the primary field of schema research, other work by 
social psychologists more interested in stereotypes per se may also be 
reinterpreted in this light.  
A common theme in stereotype studies is the suggestion that the impact of 
stereotypes is strongest when a subject's judgment task is most demanding; in 
other words, that stereotypes function as judgmental heuristics primarily under 
circumstances of cognitive complexity (von Hippel et.al 1995). This concept could 
help explain, for example, the marketing of presidential candidates. Regardless 
of the complexity of position papers posted on the Obama and Romney websites 
during the 2012 campaigns, both candidates tended to repeat a few catchy 
phrases over and over instead of engaging with thought leaders or media 
analysts. While untested in light of schema theory, it is possible that people are 
more likely to modify the cultural stereotype of politician-as-bad-guy if they are 
presented with moderately inconsistent information in the context of very simple 
judgment tasks. Certainly it was easier for an average voter to decide whether 
Obama or Romney seemed friendlier than to choose the better plan to cut the 
federal deficit. 
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Another interesting stream of research concerns the way in which subjects 
combine the attributes of individuals to form impressions of the group comprised 
of those individuals (Madon 1997). In one of a series of experiments, two groups 
of subjects were presented with slides depicting the heights of 50 men. In both 
cases, the mean height was 5 feet 10 inches, and 20% of the men were over 6 feet 
tall. However, in the "extreme condition" group, two stimulus persons were 
included whose heights were greatly over 6 feet; in the "mild condition" group, 
the two stimulus persons were just slightly over 6 feet. Results showed that 
subjects in the extreme group gave significantly higher estimates of the number 
of stimulus persons over 6 feet tall. Additionally, the researchers observed that  
recency, dramatic intensity, or novelty could magnify recall of particular factors. 
Together with other confirming data, their findings led the researchers to 
conclude that "Individuals with extreme characteristics are more memorable 
and, because of their availability in memory, are estimated as more frequent 
than corresponding numbers of 'mild' individuals. More generally, these 
experiments indicate that our impressions of groups will be disproportionately 
influenced by the characteristics of their most memorable constituents" 
(Rothbart et.al.1978). Later work extended these findings to explain impressions 
of other groups, such as gay men (Madon 1997), and also suggested that the 
news media's focus on extreme forms of behavior by individuals skews the image 
of groups to which they belong. Assuming that similar mechanisms function in 
the development of product perceptions, this perspective may help to explain 
why brands can suffer significant damage from even a short-lived, one-time 
mistake or faux pas, as in the Domino’s Pizza case. Such phenomena may 
demonstrate that enormous affective potential lies in the introduction of only a 
few extreme but memorable new attributes into an existing set of knowledge and 
beliefs. 
However, some research on stereotypes in person perception sounds a 
cautionary note regarding the applicability of all of these findings to marketing 
situations. In setting out to investigate differences between person perception 
based on stereotypes, and person perception based on simple trait categories, 
Anderson and Klatzky (1987) found that the latter called up associations 
significantly less informative, evocative, and distinctive than the former. 
Specifically, in experiments where subjects rated the strength of association 
between lists of attributes and either a trait label or a social stereotype label, the 
researchers found that stereotypes were strongly linked both to greater numbers 
of attributes and to more unique attributes than were the trait-based categories. 
They concluded that simple trait links may act more slowly in social perception 
and generate fewer predictive guidelines than full-blown stereotypes.  
The implication for marketers is that it may be easy to overestimate the 
richness and complexity of the average consumer's knowledge set about a 
product or brand. In other words, marketers may assume the presence of a 
schema-based knowledge structure where in fact there exists only the 
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association of a few descriptive terms. This is clearly problematic for any 
research designed to test the influence of such knowledge structures.   
Proposed Hypotheses for Marketing Research 
This review suggests hypotheses for research in four areas: 
1) Investigation of the relative influence of moderately inconsistent, consistent, 
and extremely inconsistent information on stereotype-driven judgments has far-
reaching implications for advertising and other forms of marketing 
communication. For example, such research could help guide BP as it seeks to 
recover from the continuing fallout of the 2010 Gulf of Mexico oil spill: What type 
of messages would be most likely to modify its current (negative) brand image? 
 
H1: Moderate schema-based brand image incongruity will lead to better recall of 
positive information about the brand than either schema congruity or extreme 
incongruity. 
H2: Moderate schema-based brand image incongruity will lead to a more positive 
overall evaluation of the brand than either schema congruity or extreme 
incongruity. 
 
In the BP example, a range of stakeholders -- including customers, employees, 
and Gulf community representatives -- could be involved in pretests to 
operationalize degrees of congruence of new information.   
 
2) Schema theory suggests that the cumulative affective impression of an entity 
may be altered, that the positives associated with a newly-communicated 
attribute will not be diluted by "averaging" them across all earlier attributes. 
Research to test this notion in a marketing context could, for example, show 
images of cigarettes to nonsmokers, then test whether is it possible to alter 
subjects' affective impressions of a given brand by associating that brand with a 
strong positive attribute. 
 
H3: Overall negative affect linked to a schema-based brand image may be at 
least partially reversed by exposing subjects to a strong positive attribute. 
 
The positive attribute, in the cigarette example, could be a testimonial that this 
particular brand has very low smoke emissions that are virtually undetectable to 
nonsmokers. Subjects could be asked for before-and-after adjective associations 
which would indicate the degree of impact achieved through exposure to the 
positive attribute. 
 
(Note that an attempt must be made to identify an affect-laden attribute which 
is not overly schema-incongruent. Otherwise, there is a risk of confounding any 
test of affect alteration with a test of the impact of schema-incongruent 
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information. In the example, the positive dimension of the experimental 
attribute is not designed to convince nonsmokers to smoke, but simply to alter 
their affective impression of this brand in a positive direction.) 
 
3) The mediating effect of cognitive task difficulty is relevant because marketers 
often must influence both judgment (relatively simple) and choice (more difficult 
and involving) in order to boost sales. 
 
H4: A schema-based brand image will strongly influence choice tasks, but will 
play little or no role in simple judgment tasks.  
  
One possible research design in this area could be a variant of a standard new 
product purchase intent testing protocol. After being given a product that is 
described as "new" but is actually a slightly modified version of a stereotype-
laden existing one, subjects could be asked to read a product description and 
then to (1) judge the product's safety, reliability, or value; or (2) spend money on 
a forced choice between the "new" product and an alternative.   
 
4) The effect of certain communication contexts could be tested by exposing 
different subject groups to the same information, while varying its dramatic 
intensity. For example, one group could get a straightforward, dry list of “new” 
facts about the lifesaving properties of aspirin, while another group saw a filmed 
“testimonial” by an actor describing how aspirin actually saved her life. 
Assuming that aspirin has a long-established, schema-based image as a simple 
home remedy without strong positive or negative associations, the goal of the 
experiment would be to test the following hypothesis: 
 
H5: The effect of new information on a schema-based product image will be 
significantly stronger when this information is presented in a dramatic or novel 
context than when it is not. 
Future Direction 
This paper has revisited major findings about the structure and influence of 
stereotypes (and more broadly, schema-based brand images) primarily from the 
past thirty years, and linked these findings to ongoing issues in marketing. In 
addition to tests of the suggested hypotheses, future studies are needed to 
compare the content and affective nature of object stereotypes to the person and 
group stereotypes that have dominated research in the past.  
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